Hazardous Welfare-State Dynamics
Hazardous Welfare-State Dynamics
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危险的福利国家动态
DOI：
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Lindbeck
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Lindbeck
现代福利国家的成就和成本通常都是静态分析的。然而，福利国家安排的某些后果可以被描述为动态的，即反映家庭、企业、利益集团组织、政客和公共部门管理者的基本行为模式随时间的相互作用的调整。毫无疑问，大多数观察者认为这些动态调整中有许多是积极的或良性的。例如，很容易想象福利国家政策在有利的情况下如何产生良性循环：减少贫困、改善社区环境、减少街头犯罪、改善低收入群体的健康状况、积累广泛分布的人力资本、提高劳动生产率以及提高妇女和各少数民族的劳动力参与率；所有这些都有助于扩大税基，从而首先促进福利国家计划的融资。我们还可以推测，福利国家政策有助于提高社会凝聚力，甚至可能提高人们对不断重新分配资源的容忍度，这是动态市场经济的特征，这增强了福利国家的合法性，从而增强了那些认为自己没有多少直接利益的人对福利国家的支持。其他动态调整则更有问题，或者说“危险”。由于篇幅有限，本文仅限于这样的调整。这并不意味着我认为积极的或良性的调整不如危险的调整重要。事实上，正是由于福利国家安排所带来的各种积极的长期后果，我经常将现代福利国家描述为“西方文明的胜利”。但如果我们不警惕危险的动态，福利国家就有可能摧毁其自身的经济基础。如今，这种风险在一些国家已经成为现实。以下讨论仅限于福利国家政策的四种危险的动态调整：（i）私人机构对福利国家政策的抑制作用的延迟调整； ㈡ 对短期宏观经济稳定造成的问题后果； (iii) 随着时间的推移，导致政治家和公共部门管理者的行为模式发生变化； (iv) 市场风险逐渐被政治风险替代。由于这些动态调整强烈相互作用，因此将它们放在一起讨论似乎很有用。
The achievements and costs of the modern welfare state are both usually analyzed in static terms. Some consequences of welfare-state arrangements, however, could rather be characterized as dynamic, in the sense of reflecting the interacting adjustments over time of basic behavior patterns of households, firms, interest-group organizations, politicians and public-sector administrators. Many of these dynamic adjustments are no doubt regarded by most observers as positive, or virtuous. For instance, it is easy to visualize how welfarestate policies, under favorable circumstances, may generate virtuous circles of reduced poverty, better neighborhoods, less street crime, improved health among lowincome groups, the accumulation of widely distributed human capital, increased labor productivity, and higher labor-force participation rates for women and various ethnic minorities; and all this contributes to expand the tax base, which facilitates the financing of the welfare-state programs in the first place. We may also speculate that welfare-state policies contribute to improved social coherence, and perhaps even to greater tolerance in the population for the continual reallocation of resources that characterizes a dynamic market economy, and that this reinforces the legitimacy and hence the support of the welfare state among those who do not perceive much direct benefit to themselves. Other dynamic adjustments are more problematic, or "hazardous." Due to limited space, this paper is confined to such adjustments. This does not mean that I regard positive, or virtuous, adjustments as less important than hazardous ones; indeed, it is largely because of various positive long-term consequences of welfare-state arrangements that I have often described the modern welfare state as "a triumph of western civilization." But if we do not watch out for hazardous dynamics, there is a risk that the welfare state will destroy its own economic foundations. That risk is today a reality in several countries. The following discussion is confined to four types of hazardous dynamic adjustments to welfare-state policies: (i) delayed adjustments by private agents to the disincentive effects of welfare-state policies; (ii) problematic consequences for short-term macroeconomic stability; (iii) induced changes over time in the behavior patterns of politicians and public-sector administrators; and (iv) the gradual replacement of market risks by political risk. As these dynamic adjustments strongly interact, it seems useful to discuss them together.