The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design
The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.89.4.748
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发表时间：
1999-09-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Peranson, E
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Roth, AE;Peranson, E
我们报道了国家住院医师匹配计划采用的新信息交换所的设计，该计划每年为新医生填补约 20,000 个职位。由于市场在申请人之间和职位之间具有互补性，因此简单匹配市场理论并不直接适用。然而，计算实验表明该理论提供了良好的近似值。此外，稳定匹配的集合以及战略操纵的机会都小得惊人。一种新的“核心收敛”结果解释了这一点；每个申请人只面试一小部分可用职位，这一点很重要。我们还描述了设计过程的工程方面。 （JEL C78、B41、J44）。
We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National Resident Matching Program, which annually fills approximately 20,000 jobs for new physicians. Because the market has complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching markets does not apply directly. However computational experiments show the theory provides goad approximations. Furthermore, the set of stable matchings, and the opportunities for strategic manipulation, are surprisingly small. A new kind of "core convergence" result explains this; that each applicant interviews only a small fraction of available positions is important. We also describe engineering aspects of the design process. (JEL C78, B41, J44).