The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation

The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation
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国际合作的国内政治

DOI:
10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.615
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发表时间:
2018
期刊:
The Review of International Organizations
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
C. Schneider
C. Schneider
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
C. Schneider

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在一个高度制度化的环境中,国内政治和国际谈判之间的互动如何影响欧元区政府同意协调金融救助的决定?我们使用博弈论模型来分析欧盟政府可能提供救助、推迟救助或将救助负担转移到其他欧元区国家的条件。我们发现,欧盟各国政府的立场,以获得最大的好处,从金融救助危机面临的最大障碍,实施协调的金融救助,只要这些行动必须发生在国内选举之前。我们建立的条件下,更大的偏好异质性的欧元区成员国可以增加金融救助的合作,而不是减少它。我们感谢马克Hallerberg,Stefanie Walter,杰夫Frieden,马克Copelovitch,亨利克Enderlein,霍斯特Zimmermann,Ludger Schuknecht,托马斯柯尼希,Rüdiger von Kleist,Ashoka Mody对本文的早期版本非常有用的意见。我们还要感谢在苏黎世(2014年)和柏林(2014年)举办的两次“欧洲危机的政治经济学”研讨会以及在柏林德国财政部举办的“危机、制度和银行联盟”会议(2014年)的与会者。施耐德获得了欧盟终身学习计划的财政支持。
How does the interaction between domestic politics and international negotiations in a highly institutionalized environment affect Eurozone governments’ decisions to agree to coordinated financial bailouts? We use a game-theoretic model to analyze the conditions under which EU governments are likely to provide bailouts, delay bailouts, or shift the burden of bailouts to other Eurozone countries. We find that EU governments that stand to receive the greatest benefits from financial rescues of crises face the greatest obstacles to implementing coordinated financial bailouts whenever these actions must take place prior to domestic elections. We establish conditions under which greater preference heterogeneity of Eurozone members can increase cooperation on financial bailouts instead of decreasing it. We are grateful for very helpful comments from Mark Hallerberg, Stefanie Walter, Jeff Frieden, Mark Copelovitch, Henrik Enderlein, Horst Zimmermann, Ludger Schuknecht, Thomas König, Rüdiger von Kleist, Ashoka Mody on an earlier version of this paper. We also thank the participants of the two “Political Economy of the Eurocrisis” workshops in Zurich (2014) and Berlin (2014), and of the “Crisis, Institutions, and Banking Union” conference at the German Finance Ministry in Berlin (2014). Schneider received financial support from the Lifelong Learning Program of the European Union.
欧洲公共领域:政治回归
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9781139963343
发表时间: 2015
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者:
T. Ed.
通讯作者: T. Ed.