The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation
The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation
复制标题
国际合作的国内政治
DOI:
10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.615
复制
发表时间:
2018
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
C. Schneider
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
C. Schneider
How does the interaction between domestic politics and international negotiations in a highly institutionalized environment affect Eurozone governments’ decisions to agree to coordinated financial bailouts? We use a game-theoretic model to analyze the conditions under which EU governments are likely to provide bailouts, delay bailouts, or shift the burden of bailouts to other Eurozone countries. We find that EU governments that stand to receive the greatest benefits from financial rescues of crises face the greatest obstacles to implementing coordinated financial bailouts whenever these actions must take place prior to domestic elections. We establish conditions under which greater preference heterogeneity of Eurozone members can increase cooperation on financial bailouts instead of decreasing it. We are grateful for very helpful comments from Mark Hallerberg, Stefanie Walter, Jeff Frieden, Mark Copelovitch, Henrik Enderlein, Horst Zimmermann, Ludger Schuknecht, Thomas König, Rüdiger von Kleist, Ashoka Mody on an earlier version of this paper. We also thank the participants of the two “Political Economy of the Eurocrisis” workshops in Zurich (2014) and Berlin (2014), and of the “Crisis, Institutions, and Banking Union” conference at the German Finance Ministry in Berlin (2014). Schneider received financial support from the Lifelong Learning Program of the European Union.
DOI:
10.1017/cbo9781139963343
发表时间:
2015
期刊:
影响因子:
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作者:
T. Ed.
通讯作者:
T. Ed.