Existence Presuppositions and Background Knowledge

Existence Presuppositions and Background Knowledge
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存在预设和背景知识

DOI:
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发表时间:
1993
影响因子:
0.9
通讯作者:
Peter Lasersohn
Peter Lasersohn
中科院分区:
人文科学2区
文献类型:
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作者:
Peter Lasersohn

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当一个定名词短语不能指称时,包含它的陈述常常被认为缺乏真值,如在The king of France is bald中。然而,在另一些例子中,这个陈述在直觉上似乎是错误的,而不是没有真理价值的:考虑这样一个例子,一个说话者指着一把明显空着的椅子说法国国王坐在那把椅子上。这种差异似乎取决于语用学的验证;我们知道这个句子是假的,因为椅子是空的,甚至不需要提出法国国王是否存在的问题。一个语义概述分配真值相对于信息状态的句子。一个包含有定名词短语的句子,如果在去掉名词短语没有提到的信息之后,所得到的信息状态仍然不能一致地扩展到使句子为真的状态,那么相对于给定的信息状态,它可以被评估为假,而不是简单地被评估为无真值。在这个假设下,现有的建议,否定语义的信息状态语义学变成对应于内部和外部否定,分别。
When a definite noun phrase fails to refer, the statement containing it is often felt to lack a truth value, as in The king of France is bald. In other examples, however, the statement seems intuitively false, and not truth-valueless: consider the case of a speaker who points at an obviously empty chair and says The king of France is sitting in that chair. The difference appears to depend on the pragmatics of verification; we know the sentence is false because the chair is empty—the question of the existence of the king of France need not even come up. A semantics is sketched for assigning truth values to sentences relative to information states. A sentence containing a definite NP may be evaluated as false relative to a given information state rather than simply truth-valueless if, after removing the information that the NP fails to refer, the resulting information state still cannot be consistently extended to one making the sentence true. On this assumption, existing proposals for the semantics of negation in information-state semantics turn out to correspond to internal and external negation, respectively.