Can Cheap Talk Deter ? An Experimental Analysis
Can Cheap Talk Deter ? An Experimental Analysis
复制标题
廉价的言论可以阻止吗？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Barbara F. Walter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Tingley;Barbara F. Walter
在进入-威慑游戏中，廉价言论对行为有什么影响？我们通过对防御者和潜在进入者之间的战略互动进行受激励的实验室实验，阐明了这个问题。我们的结果表明，廉价谈话可以对目标和说话人的行为产生实质性的影响。通过向潜在的进入者发送廉价的威胁，后卫能够在比赛的早期阶段威慑对手。此外，在发出威胁后，捍卫者变得更加渴望战斗。对于这种行为，我们提供了许多不同的解释。这些结果带来了新的证据，证明了免费口头交流对国际关系领域的潜在重要性。
What effect does cheap talk have on behavior in an entry-deterrence game? We shed light on this question using incentivized laboratory experiments of the strategic interaction between defenders and potential entrants. Our results suggest that cheap talk can have a substantial impact on the behavior of both the target and the speaker. By sending costless threats to potential entrants, defenders are able to deter opponents in early periods of play. Moreover, after issuing threats, defenders become more eager to fight. We offer a number of different explanations for this behavior. These results bring fresh evidence about the potential importance of costless verbal communication to the field of international relations.