Mixed duopoly: Differential game approach
Mixed duopoly: Differential game approach
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DOI：
10.1111/jpet.12372
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发表时间：
2019-08
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Koichi Futagami;Toshihiro Matsumura;Kizuku Takao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Koichi Futagami;Toshihiro Matsumura;Kizuku Takao
以往的微分博弈研究表明，跨期策略行为对各种经济问题都有重要作用。然而，他们的大多数分析仅限于目标函数相同的情况下，代理。在本文中，我们刻画了一个混合双寡头博弈的开环纳什均衡和马尔可夫完美纳什均衡，其中完全或部分国有企业和完全私有企业竞争的同质产品的数量粘性价格。我们证明了在马尔可夫完美纳什均衡中，政府对国有企业持股的增加对价格的影响是非单调的，并且在很宽的参数空间内，政府持股会使价格增加。这些结果是由目标代理人的非对称结构与跨期策略行为的相互作用所产生的，与开环纳什均衡中的结果形成了鲜明的对比。我们提供了新的含义，私有化政策中存在的动态相互作用，对静态分析。
Previous studies in differential games reveal that intertemporal strategic behaviors have an important role for various economic problems. However, most of their analyses are limited to cases where objective functions are identical among agents. In this paper, we characterize the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium of a mixed duopoly game where a fully or partially state-owned firm and a fully private firm compete in the quantities of homogeneous goods with sticky prices. We show that in the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium, an increase in the governments f share-holdings of the state-owned firm has a non-monotonic effect on the price, and in a wide range of parameter spaces, it increases the price. These results are derived from the interaction of an asymmetric structure of agents f objectives and inter-temporal strategic behaviors, which are in sharp contrast with those in the open-loop Nash equilibrium. We provide new implications for privatizationpolicies in the presence of dynamic interactions, against the static analyses.