Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market
Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market
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DOI：
10.2307/2971723
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发表时间：
1997-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Acemoglu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Acemoglu
这篇论文表明，在一个摩擦的劳动力市场中，来自一般培训的生产率收益的一部分将被未来的雇主获取。因此，对一般技能的投资将是次优的，与标准理论相反，部分成本可能由雇主承担。论文还论证了创新和培训之间的相互作用导致了这种低效的放大，并导致了多种均衡。如果工人们希望更多的公司进行创新，并在未来向他们支付更高的工资，他们就更愿意通过接受更低的工资来投资于他们的技能。同样，当企业期望未来劳动力的质量更高时，他们更愿意创新，因此当工人在他们的技能上投入更多时。
This paper shows that in a frictional labour market part of the productivity gains from general training will be captured by future employers. As a result, investments in general skills will be suboptimally low, and contrary to the standard theory, part of the costs may be borne by the employers. The paper also demonstrates that the interaction between innovation and training leads to an amplification of this inefficiency and to a multiplicity of equilibria. Workers are more willing to invest in their skills by accepting lower wages today if they expect more firms to innovate and pay them higher wages in the future. Similarly, firms are more willing to innovate when they expect the quality of the future workforce to be higher, thus when workers invest more in their skills.