Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The 'Boston' Mechanism Reconsidered
Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The 'Boston' Mechanism Reconsidered
复制标题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1456088
复制
发表时间：
2009-08
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Atila Abdulkadiroglu;Yeon-Koo Che;Yosuke Yasuda
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Atila Abdulkadiroglu;Yeon-Koo Che;Yosuke Yasuda
尽管波士顿机制被广泛使用，但与Gale-Shapley延迟接受算法（DA）相比，它的激励和福利表现较差。相比之下，当学生有相同的顺序偏好和学校没有优先级，我们发现，波士顿机制帕累托主导的DA在事前福利，它可能不会伤害，而是有利于参与者谁可能没有制定好战略，而且，在学校的优先事项的存在，波士顿机制也倾向于促进更多的访问比DA那些缺乏优先级的好学校。(JEL D82、I21、I28）
Despite its widespread use, the Boston mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances compared to the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (DA). By contrast, when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools have no priorities, we find that the Boston mechanism Pareto dominates the DA in ex ante welfare, that it may not harm but rather benefit participants who may not strategize well, and that, in the presence of school priorities, the Boston mechanism also tends to facilitate greater access than the DA to good schools for those lacking priorities at those schools. (JEL D82, I21, I28)