Strategic guard placement for optimal response toalarms in security games
Strategic guard placement for optimal response toalarms in security games
复制标题
在安全游戏中对警报进行最佳响应的策略性警卫布局
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
N. Gatti
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Nicola Basilico;N. Gatti
我们介绍了一个带有单个静态守卫的安全游戏，该守卫由许多空间不完美的警报支持。我们用两个非合作游戏来模拟这种情况，模拟了防御者和攻击者之间的两种不同的战略互动。在第一个游戏中，防守者必须根据当前位置对激活的警报做出响应(警报-响应游戏)。在第二个游戏中，防守者必须确定进行任何警报响应的最佳静态位置(守卫-放置游戏)。
We introduce a Security Game with a single static guard that is supported by a number of spatially imperfect alarms. We model this setting with two non-cooperative games modeling two different strategic interactions between a Defender and an Attacker. In the first one the Defender has to respond to an activated alarm given its current position (Alarm-Response Game). In the second one, the Defender has to determine the best static placement from which undertakes any alarm response (Guard-Placement Game).