An evolutionary game approach for determination of the structural conflicts in signed networks.
An evolutionary game approach for determination of the structural conflicts in signed networks.
复制标题
确定符号网络结构冲突的进化博弈方法
DOI：
10.1038/srep22022
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发表时间：
2016-02-26
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Lü J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tan S;Lü J
社会或生物化学网络通常可以分为两个相反的联盟，以应对积极（友好，激活）和消极（敌对，抑制）相互作用之间的结构性冲突。然而，关于如何自发地形成相反的联盟以最大限度地减少结构性冲突的潜在动力仍然不清楚。在这里，我们证明了进化游戏动力学提供了一个恰当的可能工具来描述签名网络中联盟的进化和形成。事实上，一个进化的博弈动力学签名的网络，提出了这样的每个节点可以自适应地调整其选择的联盟，以最大限度地提高自己的健身，这还导致在整个网络中的结构冲突最小化。数值实验表明，进化博弈方法是普遍有效的质量和速度，找到所有无向或有向，无权或加权签署网络的最优解。此外，进化博弈方法本质上是分布式的。这些特点表明，进化博弈动态方法作为一个可行的和有效的工具，确定在大规模的在线签署网络的结构冲突。
Social or biochemical networks can often divide into two opposite alliances in response to structural conflicts between positive (friendly, activating) and negative (hostile, inhibiting) interactions. Yet, the underlying dynamics on how the opposite alliances are spontaneously formed to minimize the structural conflicts is still unclear. Here, we demonstrate that evolutionary game dynamics provides a felicitous possible tool to characterize the evolution and formation of alliances in signed networks. Indeed, an evolutionary game dynamics on signed networks is proposed such that each node can adaptively adjust its choice of alliances to maximize its own fitness, which yet leads to a minimization of the structural conflicts in the entire network. Numerical experiments show that the evolutionary game approach is universally efficient in quality and speed to find optimal solutions for all undirected or directed, unweighted or weighted signed networks. Moreover, the evolutionary game approach is inherently distributed. These characteristics thus suggest the evolutionary game dynamic approach as a feasible and effective tool for determining the structural conflicts in large-scale on-line signed networks.