The Political Economy of SME Financing and Japan's Regional Bank Problems
The Political Economy of SME Financing and Japan's Regional Bank Problems
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中小企业融资的政治经济学与日本地区银行问题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.902791
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Chongwoo Choe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Chongwoo Choe
日本地方银行的问题可以概括为不良贷款的积累、缺乏多样化和随之而来的投资组合风险以及缺乏有效竞争。本文认为，地方银行问题应与中小企业融资和中央及地方政府的政治利益相结合来解决。出于政治利益，可能需要为区域中小企业的次优投资项目提供资金，或维持业绩不佳的中小企业的生存。通过与区域银行的密切联系，政府可以或明或暗地影响银行的融资决策。特别是，贷款偿还担保表明，减少了银行审查贷款申请的积极性，并通过阻止其他银行进入而损害竞争。本文提出了解决日本地区银行问题的一些政策建议。
The regional bank problems in Japan can be summarized as accumulating non-performing loans, the lack of diversification and attendant portfolio risk, and the absence of effective competition. This paper argues that the regional bank problems should be addressed in conjunction with the financing of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the political interests of the central and regional governments. The political interests may necessitate funding suboptimal investment projects of regional SMEs or keeping non-performing SMEs alive. Through close ties with regional banks, the governments can influence the banks' financing decisions either explicitly or implicitly. In particular, loan repayment guarantees are shown to reduce the banks' incentives to screen loan applications and harm competition by deterring entry of other banks. This paper offers some policy implications in solving Japan's regional bank problems.