Does Neutral Affect Exist? How Challenging Three Beliefs About Neutral Affect Can Advance Affective Research
Does Neutral Affect Exist? How Challenging Three Beliefs About Neutral Affect Can Advance Affective Research
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DOI：
10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02476
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发表时间：
2019-11-08
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Hu, Danfei
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gasper, Karen;Spencer, Lauren A.;Hu, Danfei
对情感感兴趣的研究人员经常质疑中性情感状态的存在。在本文中，我们回顾并挑战了研究人员可能持有的关于中性情感的三种信念。这些信念是：（1）不可能感到中立，因为人们总是在感受某些东西；（2）中立不是一种情感状态，因为情感必须是正价或负价；（3）中性情感并不重要，因为它不影响认知或行为。我们回顾了这些信念可能存在的原因，并提供了质疑它们的经验证据。具体来说，我们认为中性情感是一种感受体验，提供重要的价相关信息，影响认知和行为。通过消除这些关于中性情感的信念，我们希望阐明研究人员对情感本质的假设，并提供新颖的理论和方法论视角，帮助增进我们对情感景观的理解。
Researchers interested in affect have often questioned the existence of neutral affective states. In this paper, we review and challenge three beliefs that researchers might hold about neutral affect. These beliefs are: (1) it is not possible to feel neutral because people are always feeling something, (2) neutrality is not an affective state because affect must be positively or negatively valenced, and (3) neutral affect is unimportant because it does not influence cognition or behavior. We review the reasons these beliefs might exist and provide empirical evidence that questions them. Specifically, we argue that neutral affect is a felt experience that provides important valence-relevant information, which influences cognition and behavior. By dispelling these beliefs about neutral affect, we hope to shine a light on the assumptions that researchers hold about the nature of affect and to provide novel theoretical and methodological perspectives that help advance our understanding of the affective landscape.