Combined Cache Timing Attacks and Template Attacks on Stream Cipher MUGI
Combined Cache Timing Attacks and Template Attacks on Stream Cipher MUGI
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-319-17533-1_17
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发表时间：
2015-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Shaoyu Du;Zhenqi Li;Bin Zhang;D. Lin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shaoyu Du;Zhenqi Li;Bin Zhang;D. Lin
The stream cipher MUGI was proposed by Hitachi, Ltd. in 2002 and it was specified as ISO/IEC 18033-4 for keystream generation. Assuming that noise-free cache timing measurements are possible, we give the cryptanalysis of MUGI under the cache attack model. Our simulation results show that we can reduce the computation complexity of recovering all the 1216-bits internal state of MUGI to aboutO(276) when it is implemented in processors with 64-byte cache line. The attack reveals some new inherent weaknesses of MUGI’s structure. The weaknesses can also be used to conduct a noiseless template attack ofO(260.51) computation complexity to restore the state of MUGI. And then combining these two attacks we can conduct a key-recovery attack on MUGI with aboutO(230) computation complexity. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that the analysis of cache timing attacks and template attacks are applied to full version of MUGI and that these two classes of attacks are combined to attack some cipher. Moreover, the combination can be used to improve the error-tolerance capability of each attack. If each measurement has one additional error, the key-recovery attack will take aboutO(250) computation complexity.
