Systems Defense Games: Colonel Blotto, Command and Control
Systems Defense Games: Colonel Blotto, Command and Control
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系统防御游戏：《布洛托上校》、《指挥与控制》
DOI：
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发表时间：
1981
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Weber
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Shubik;R. Weber
经典的“布洛托上校”力量分配游戏被推广到包括被防御目标之间存在互补性的情况。这种互补性通过系统的“特征函数”来表示，合作博弈理论中的一种评估技术被认为是防御和攻击力量的最优配置。讨论了系统防御和替代措施(如加固目标)之间的成本权衡，并通过一个简单的例子分析了这种方法的潜力。
The classical “Colonel Blotto” games of force allocation are generalized to include situations in which there are complementarities among the targets being defended. The complementarities are represented by means of a system “characteristic function,” and a valuation technique from the theory of cooperative games is seen to indicate the optimal allocations of defense and attack forces. Cost trade‐offs between systems defense and alternative measures, such as the hardening of targets, are discussed, and a simple example is analyzed in order to indicate the potential of this approach.