In What Sense Is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion

In What Sense Is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion
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知识在什么意义上是断言的规范

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发表时间:
2008
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通讯作者:
P. Engel
P. Engel
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作者:
P. Engel

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断言的知识解释(KAA)是这样一种观点,即断言受说话人应该知道他/她所断言的内容这一规范的支配。本文的目的不是审查所有的批评,也不是试图为KAA提供充分的辩护,而只是为它在规范上不正确的指控辩护。有人反对说,断言受知识以外的规范支配,或者根本不受规范支配。然而,在我看来,这些批评中有许多是基于对规范概念的误解,以及对规范规范特定实践的方式的误解。一旦我们阐明了知识在何种意义上可以在这种情况下发挥规范作用,KAA就显得更加可信了。
The knowledge account of assertion (KAA) is the view that assertion is governed by the norm that the speaker should know what s/he asserts. It is not the purpose of this article to examine all the criticisms nor to try to give a full defence of KAA, but only to defend it against the charge of being normatively incorrect. It has been objected that assertion is governed by other norms than knowledge, or by no norm at all. It seems to me, however, that a number of these criticisms are based on a number of misunderstandings of the notion of a norm and of the way it can regulated a given practice. Once we spell out in what sense knowledge can play a normative role in this context, the KAA appears much more plausible.