Privacy-Security Trade-Offs in Biometric Security Systems-Part I: Single Use Case
Privacy-Security Trade-Offs in Biometric Security Systems-Part I: Single Use Case
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DOI：
10.1109/tifs.2010.2098872
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发表时间：
2011-03-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Poor, H. Vincent
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lai, Lifeng;Ho, Siu-Wai;Poor, H. Vincent
这是关于生物识别安全系统信息理论研究的两部分论文的第一部分。本文从信息论的角度分析了一次性生物识别安全系统的设计。一个基本的权衡之间的隐私，测量的生物特征测量的归一化含糊率，和安全性，测量从生物特征测量生成的密钥的速率，被确定。隐私安全区域，其特征在于上述权衡，推导出这种情况下。然后考虑系统的攻击者具有边信息的情况。在这种情况下，内部和外部的隐私安全区域的边界。最后，生物特征安全系统与完美的隐私进行了研究，这是可能的，当且仅当共同的随机性可以产生两个生物特征测量。
This is the first part of a two-part paper on the information theoretic study of biometric security systems. In this paper, the design of single-use biometric security systems is analyzed from an information theoretic perspective. A fundamental trade-off between privacy, measured by the normalized equivocation rate of the biometric measurements, and security, measured by the rate of the key generated from the biometric measurements, is identified. The privacy-security region, which characterizes the above-noted trade-off, is derived for this case. The scenario in which an attacker of the system has side information is then considered. Inner and outer bounds on the privacy-security region are derived in this case. Finally, biometric security systems with perfect privacy are studied, which is shown to be possible if and only if common randomness can be generated from two biometric measurements.