Endogenous Cost Differentials between Public and Private Enterprises: A Mixed Duopoly Approach
Endogenous Cost Differentials between Public and Private Enterprises: A Mixed Duopoly Approach
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00394.x
复制
发表时间：
2004-11
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Toshihiro Matsumura;Noriaki Matsushima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Toshihiro Matsumura;Noriaki Matsushima
我们研究了一个混合双寡头垄断，一个国有福利最大化的上市公司与一个利润最大化的私人公司竞争。我们使用一个酒店式的空间模型，代表产品的差异化。我们通过引入降低成本的活动，使生产成本内生化。我们表明，私人公司的成本变得低于上市公司的，因为私人公司从事过度的战略成本降低活动。即使每个企业的成本是异质的，企业的位置是社会效率，鉴于成本差异。公营公司的私有化将改善福利，因为它将减轻过度降低成本投资所造成的损失。
We investigate a mixed duopoly, where a state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm competes against a profit-maximizing private firm. We use a Hotelling-type spatial model which represents product differentiation. We endogenize production costs by introducing cost-reducing activities. We show that the private firm's cost becomes lower than the public firm's because the private firm engages in excessive strategic cost-reducing activities. Even though each firm's cost is heterogeneous, the locations of the firms are socially efficient, given the cost differentials. Privatization of the public firm would improve welfare because it would mitigate the loss arising from excessive cost-reducing investments.