Divided Politics: Bicameralism, Parties, and Policy in Democratic Legislatures
Divided Politics: Bicameralism, Parties, and Policy in Democratic Legislatures
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分裂的政治：两院制、政党和民主立法机构的政策
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发表时间：
2007
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通讯作者：
William B. Heller
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作者：
William B. Heller
▪ 摘要 这篇文章调查了立法两院制的理由和影响。从本质上讲，第二议院促进了原本可能被忽视的群体或利益的代表。要做到这一点，他们不仅提供更多的立法议席给从不同地区和可能根据不同规则选出的立法者，更重要的是让更多立法者在立法过程中有发言权。两院制的传统观点认为，第二议院可能很重要，因为它们的成员有权否决或至少推迟法案，因此它们是否确实影响立法内容取决于众议院之间是否以及在多大程度上多数人的偏好存在差异。一种新的立法研究趋势侧重于第二议院的存在如何为政策讨价还价提供了一个论坛，并在此过程中创造了在党派内部以及跨议院多数席位进行政策谈判的必要性，而这在一院制立法机构中是不必要的。
▪ Abstract This article surveys the rationales for and effects of legislative bicameralism. At heart, second chambers facilitate representation for groups or interests that otherwise might be ignored. They do so not only by making more legislative seats available to legislators elected from different districts and possibly by different rules, but more importantly by giving more legislators a voice in the legislative process. Traditional views of bicameralism hold that second chambers can matter because their members have the authority to veto or at least delay bills, so that whether they do in fact affect legislative content depends on whether and to what extent majority preferences differ across chambers. A new current of legislative research focuses on how the existence of a second chamber provides a forum for bargaining over policy and, in the process, creates a need for policy bargains within parties as well as across chamber majorities that would be unnecessary in a unicameral legislature.