Partisan Politics, Party Competition and Veto Players: German Economic Policy in the Kohl Era
Partisan Politics, Party Competition and Veto Players: German Economic Policy in the Kohl Era
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党派政治、政党竞争和否决权玩家：科尔时代的德国经济政策
DOI：
10.1017/s0143814x03003064
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发表时间：
2003
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Reimut Zohlnhöfer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Reimut Zohlnhöfer
本文用一个以党派理论为出发点，但补充了党派竞争和否决者影响的模型来解释德国的经济政策。在1980年代，基督教民主党内部凝聚力低，沿着积极的经济表现，使联合政府无法推行连贯的改革。由于失去了第二议院的多数席位，与反对派的妥协是必要的，这进一步削弱了改革，几乎没有例外。当政府面临日益恶化的经济状况，使其连任面临风险时，它引入了更激进的改革。然而，由于反对派在第二议院占多数，这些改革有失败的风险。总而言之，Tsebelis的否决者理论得到了一些条件的证实，其中最重要的是，它还必须考虑到行动者的战略取向。
The article explains economic policy in Germany with a model that takes partisan theory as its starting point, but supplements it with the impact of party competition and veto players. During the 1980s the low internal cohesion of the Christian democrats along with a positive economic performance kept the coalition from introducing coherent reforms. With the loss of the majority in the second chamber, compromises with the opposition were necessary which further diluted reforms with few exceptions. When the government faced worsening economic conditions which put its re-election at risk, it introduced more radical reforms. Because of an opposition majority in the second chamber, however, those reforms ran the risk of failing. In sum, Tsebelis' veto player theory is corroborated with some qualifications, the most important of which is that it must also take into account strategic orientations of actors.