The Second-Price Auction Solves King Solomon's Dilemma
The Second-Price Auction Solves King Solomon's Dilemma
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二价拍卖解决了所罗门王的困境
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.926634
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. R. Mihara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. R. Mihara
考虑在n个代理之间分配k个相同的不可分割的对象的问题，其中k小于n。规划者的目标是以零成本的规划者和代理人的对象给前k个估价代理人。每个代理人都知道这k个代理人的身份，以及她自己对对象的估价。通过引入少量的参与费和参与（不参与）的选择权来修改第（k+1）价密封投标拍卖。这种非常简单的机制（修改后的拍卖）在迭代弱非支配策略中实现了期望的结果。
Consider the problem of allocating k identical, indivisible objects among n agents, where k is less than n. The planner's objective is to give the objects to the top k valuation agents at zero costs to the planner and the agents. Each agent knows the identity of those k agents, as well as her own valuation of the object. Modify the (k+1)st-price sealed-bid auction by introducing a small participation fee and the option (not) to participate in it. This strikingly simple mechanism (modified auction) implements the desired outcome in iteratively weakly undominated strategies.