A game theoretic analysis of delay attacks against time synchronization protocols
A game theoretic analysis of delay attacks against time synchronization protocols
复制标题
针对时间同步协议的延迟攻击的博弈论分析
DOI：
10.1109/ispcs.2012.6336612
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Tal Mizrahi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tal Mizrahi
时间同步协议在分组网络中已经变得非常普遍，并且因此暴露于各种安全攻击。延迟攻击是针对同步协议的最有效的攻击之一，在该攻击中，中间人攻击者选择性地延迟时间协议分组。这种攻击是非常有效的，因为它不能通过传统的安全措施，如身份验证或加密。在本文中，我们介绍了一种新的方法来分析延迟攻击，使用博弈论模型。我们分析了攻击者和被攻击者的可能策略，并介绍了一种新的策略，用于减轻延迟攻击，使用主时钟和从时钟之间的多个路径。我们还讨论了我们模型中的纳什均衡及其与现实攻击可能结果的联系。
Time synchronization protocols have become very common in packet networks, and are consequently exposed to various security attacks. One of the most effective attacks against synchronization protocols is the delay attack, in which a man-in-the-middle attacker selectively delays the time protocol packets. This attack is exceptionally effective, as it cannot be prevented by conventional security measures such as authentication or encryption. In this paper we introduce a new approach to analyzing the delay attack, using a game theoretic model. We analyze the possible strategies of the attacker and attackee, and introduce a novel strategy for mitigating delay attacks using multiple paths between the master and slave clocks. We also discuss the Nash equilibria in our model and their connection to the possible outcomes of real-life attacks.