Redistributive Politics and Government Debt in a Borrowing-constrained Economy
Redistributive Politics and Government Debt in a Borrowing-constrained Economy
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借贷受限经济中的再分配政治和政府债务
DOI：
10.1111/boer.12005
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
Tetsuo Ono
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ryo Arawatari;Tetsuo Ono
我们开发了一个两阶段，三类收入模型，其中低收入代理人由于资本市场的不完善而受到借贷约束，并且再分配支出由税收和政府债务融资。当资本市场的不完善程度很高时，存在一个反对中产阶级的均衡，在这个均衡中，受约束的低收入和不受约束的高收入行为人倾向于低水平的政府债务和再分配支出;这些行为人形成了一个反对中产阶级的联盟。在这种均衡中，政府债务和支出水平可能低于有效水平，收入分配的分散导致债务与GDP比率较低。
We develop a two‐period, three‐class of income model where low‐income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where the constrained low‐income and the unconstrained high‐income agents favour low levels of government debt and redistributive expenditure; these agents form a coalition against the middle. In this equilibrium, the levels of government debt and expenditure might be below the efficient levels, and the spread of income distribution results in a lower debt‐to‐GDP ratio.