Search Deterrence
Search Deterrence
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DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdv036
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发表时间：
2016-01-01
影响因子：
5.8
通讯作者：
Zhou, Jidong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Armstrong, Mark;Zhou, Jidong
我们研究的销售技巧，通过使消费者在寻找替代品后更难或更昂贵地返回购买来阻止消费者搜索。在温和的条件下，卖家阻止搜索是单方面有利可图的，但当所有卖家都这样做时，卖家可能会受到影响。当卖方不能承诺其政策时，它会利用这样的推论，即那些试图稍后购买的消费者没有好的选择，在许多情况下，结果就像卖方必须提出爆炸性的报价。搜索威慑导致产品与消费者的次优匹配，并往往提高消费者支付的价格。
We study sales techniques which discourage consumer search by making it harder or more expensive to return to buy after a search for alternatives. It is unilaterally profitable for a seller to deter search under mild conditions, but sellers can suffer when all do so. When a seller cannot commit to its policy, it exploits the inference that those consumers who try to buy later have no good alternative, and in many cases the outcome is as if the seller must make an exploding offer. Search deterrence results in sub-optimal matching of products to consumers and often raises the price consumers pay.