The optimal multi-period modular design with fairness concerns
The optimal multi-period modular design with fairness concerns
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考虑公平性的最优多周期模块化设计
DOI：
10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.10.007
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
12
通讯作者：
Li Qingying
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Li Qingying
在本文中，我们考虑一个多周期的模块化设计模型与公平性的关注。在第一阶段，市场需求信息是未知的，零售商需要投资于产品的模块化设计。在市场规模信息变得可用后，零售商与制造商在第二阶段进行交易，我们假设制造商或零售商都有分配公平问题。在每种情况下，我们确定的零售商的最佳模块化设计决策，除了零售商和制造商的预期利润，我们比较的结果与传统的情况下。研究发现，当制造商具有公平意识时，双重边际化效应可能会加剧;而当零售商具有公平意识时，双重边际化效应会减轻。然而，在这两种情况下，一个简单的批发价格合同不能协调供应链。还进行了敏感性分析。
In this paper we consider a multi-period modular design model with fairness concerns. In the first period, market demand information is unknown and the retailer needs to invest in the products' modular design. After market size information becomes available, the retailer trades with the manufacturer in the second period, where we assume either the manufacturer or the retailer has a distributional fairness concern. In each case, we determine the retailer's optimal modular design decision in addition to the retailer and manufacturer's expected profits, and we compare the results with that in the conventional cases. We find that when the manufacturer is fair minded, the double marginalization effect may be exacerbated; while when the retailer is fair minded, the double marginalization effect can be mitigated. However, in both cases, a simple wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. Sensitivity analysis is also conducteds.