Accuracy and Evidence Accuracy and Evidence
Accuracy and Evidence Accuracy and Evidence
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准确性和证据 准确性和证据
DOI：
10.1111/1746-8361.12043
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Pettigrew R
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文献类型：
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作者：
Pettigrew R
在《概率论的非实用主义辩护》中，吉姆·乔伊斯认为，我们的可信度应该遵守概率演算的公理，并表明，如果不遵守，就会有其他可信度保证比我们的更准确。但似乎准确性并不是信任的唯一目标：还有一个目标是将一个人的信任与一个证据相匹配。我将考虑四种方式来使后一个目标变得精确：第一个，这个目标所产生的规范充当我们选择信任的“侧面约束”；第二，将可信度与证据相匹配是一个与准确性进行权衡的目标，以给出可信度的整体认知价值；在第三个方面，与第二个一样，接近证据目标和接近准确性目标都是价值来源，但这一次它们是无法比较的；第四，证据目标根本不是一个独立的目标，而是准确性目标的副产品。除了第四种使证据目标精确的方法之外，所有方法都是关于信仰美德的多元化：有准确的美德，也有匹配证据的美德，两者都不能还原为另一个。第四种方式是关于信仰美德的一元论：只有准确的美德。多元主义立场给乔伊斯的论证带来了问题。一元论立场避免了它们。我赞成后者。
In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, Jim Joyce argues that our credences should obey the axioms of the probability calculus by showing that, if they don't, there will be alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than ours. But it seems that accuracy is not the only goal of credences: there is also the goal of matching one's credences to one's evidence. I will consider four ways in which we might make this latter goal precise: on the first, the norms to which this goal gives rise act as ‘side constraints’ on our choice of credences; on the second, matching credences to evidence is a goal that is weighed against accuracy to give the overall cognitive value of credences; on the third, as on the second, proximity to the evidential goal and proximity to the goal of accuracy are both sources of value, but this time they are incomparable; on the fourth, the evidential goal is not an independent goal at all, but rather a byproduct of the goal of accuracy. All but the fourth way of making the evidential goal precise are pluralist about credal virtue: there is the virtue of being accurate and there is the virtue of matching the evidence and neither reduces to the other. The fourth way is monist about credal virtue: there is just the virtue of being accurate. The pluralist positions lead to problems for Joyce's argument; the monist position avoids them. I endorse the latter.