Principal-Agent Problems with Present-Biased Agents
Principal-Agent Problems with Present-Biased Agents
复制标题
当前偏向代理的委托代理问题
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Dolav Soker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sigal Oren;Dolav Soker
我们提出了一种新的图论委托-代理模型，其中代理存在偏见（这种偏见在行为经济学中得到了很好的研究）。我们的模型捕捉了委托人在复杂的多步骤项目中指导代理人的情况。我们将项目的不同步骤和分支建模为具有源和目标的有向无环图，其中每条边都有完成相应任务的代价。如果代理到达目标接收一些固定奖励r .我们假设present-biased代理遍历图的框架和奥伦(EC jonkleinberg 14),因此将继续遍历图,只要他认为成本小于r .我们进一步假设每条边被分配一个值,如果代理达到目标的主要的回报值的总和代理遍历路径上的边。在这项工作中，我们的目标是了解主体是否可以有效地计算出一个子图，使其在代理到达目标的所有子图中获得最大的收益。对于这个中心问题，我们提供了不可能结果和算法。
We present a novel graph-theoretic principal-agent model in which the agent is present biased (a bias that was well studied in behavioral economics). Our model captures situations in which a principal guides an agent in a complex multi-step project. We model the different steps and branches of the project as a directed acyclic graph with a source and a target, in which each edge has the cost for completing a corresponding task. If the agent reaches the target it receives some fixed reward R. We assume that the present-biased agent traverses the graph according to the framework of Kleinberg and Oren (EC’14) and as such will continue traversing the graph as long as his perceived cost is less than R. We further assume that each edge is assigned a value and if the agent reaches the target the principal’s payoff is the sum of values of the edges on the path that the agent traversed. Our goal in this work is to understand whether the principal can efficiently compute a subgraph that maximizes his payoff among all subgraphs in which the agent reaches the target. For this central question we provide both impossibility results and algorithms.