Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives
Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives
复制标题
授权和非金钱激励
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Georgy Egorov
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Ambrus;Georgy Egorov
在许多契约环境中，对一方来说代价高昂但对另一方没有直接利益的行为（烧钱）可能是明示或默示契约的一部分。一个主要的例子是雇主与雇员关系中的官僚程序。我们研究了一个模型的授权与一个知情的代理人，在那里的主要可能会对代理人的行为选择的函数，并表明，烧钱可能是最优合同的一部分。这一结果即使在行动或有货币转移是可能的情况下也成立，只要从委托人到代理人的转移是有界的（如有限责任或最低工资要求）。事实上，最优契约可以包括有效的货币激励和无效的非货币激励的组合，通过烧钱。我们的模型提供了一些新颖的结果代表文学。首先，如果委托人对行为选择比代理人更敏感，那么烧钱的可能性更大。这与人们认为大型组织的官僚化程度更高的看法是一致的。第二，如果代理人的有限责任约束相对于他的参与约束更严格，烧钱的可能性更大。这意味着，更高的最低工资扭曲了就业合同，使其倾向于使用社会浪费性的非货币激励措施，导致帕累托劣效，因为代理人仍然通过增加烧钱来保持其保留价值。http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700851
In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in an employer-employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed agent, where the principal may impose money-burning on the agent as a function of the agent’s choice of action, and show that money-burning may be part of the optimal contract. This result holds even if action-contingent monetary transfers are possible, as long as transfers from the principal to the agent are bounded from below (as in limited liability or minimal wage requirements). In fact, the optimal contract can involve a combination of both efficient monetary incentives and inefficient nonmonetary incentives through money burning. Our model delivers some results novel to the delegation literature. First, money-burning is more likely if the principal is more sensitive to the choice of action than the agent. This is consistent with the perception that there is more bureaucratization in large organizations. Second, money-burning is more likely if the agent’s limited liability constraint is tighter relative to his participation constraint. This implies that a higher minimum wage distorts employment contracts towards using socially wasteful nonmonetary incentives, leading to a Pareto inferior outcome as the agent is still held down to his reservation value through increased money burning.The appendices for this paper are available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700851