The design of public agencies: overcoming agency costs and commitment problems
The design of public agencies: overcoming agency costs and commitment problems
复制标题
公共机构的设计：克服代理成本和承诺问题
DOI：
10.1002/pad.317
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发表时间：
2004
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Kutsal Yesilkagit
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kutsal Yesilkagit
本文主要从政治学的角度来探讨制度设计的问题。它使用委托代理框架研究代理问题，并试图解释承诺问题和代理问题之间的选择。所处理的根本问题是在政治控制政策的更广泛框架内可能的自治程度。版权所有© 2004年约翰威利父子有限公司。
This article focuses on problems of institutional design from a political perspective. It examines the problems of agentification using a principal–agent framework, and attempts to explain the choices made between problems of commitment and problems of agency. The fundamental problem addressed is the degree of autonomy possible within a broader framework of political control of policy. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.