Heterogeneity, social esteem and feasibility of collective action
Heterogeneity, social esteem and feasibility of collective action
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异质性、社会尊重和集体行动的可行性
DOI：
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.03.005
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
E. Seki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Platteau;E. Seki
在存在个体异质性的情况下，平等主义伙伴关系（如完全收入集中）的一个主要问题是，能力相对较高的个人会被诱导退出这种安排。然而，这忽视了基于成员表现比较的社会尊重考虑的可能影响。在本文中，从日本渔业的经验汇集的启示，我们表明，如果对社会尊重的敏感性不太强也不太弱，退出问题是可以克服的。如果它太强，能力较低的代理人将退出社会羞耻，而如果它太弱，能力较高的代理人将认为不值得将收入转移给他们的合作伙伴。当这种安排是可持续的，能力较低的人努力限制收入差距。
In the presence of individual heterogeneity, a major problem with egalitarian partnership, such as complete income pooling, is that individuals of comparatively high ability are induced to exit the arrangement. This is nevertheless ignoring the possible impact of social esteem considerations based on a comparison of members' performances. In this paper, drawing inspiration from pooling experiences in a Japanese fishery, we show that the exit problem can be surmounted if sensitivity to social esteem is neither too strong nor too weak. If it is too strong, the lower ability agents will exit out of social shame whereas, if it is too weak, the higher ability agents will not consider it worthwhile to transfer income to their partners. When the arrangement is sustainable, the lower ability people strive towards limiting the income gap.