Belief revision in a framework for default reasoning

Belief revision in a framework for default reasoning
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默认推理框架中的信念修正

DOI:
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发表时间:
1989
期刊:
Logic of Theory Change
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
G. Brewka
G. Brewka
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
G. Brewka

文献摘要

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我们提出了一种方法,它提供了一个共同的解决方案,最近解决的问题,在两个不同的研究领域:非单调推理和理论修订。我们定义了一个框架,默认推理的基础上的概念,首选的最大一致子集的前提。与其他形式化的默认推理相反,这个框架也能够处理意想不到的不一致。这使得通过简单地添加新信息来处理缺省理论的修正成为可能。收缩需要引入约束,即用于确定优选的最大相容子集但不用于确定可导出公式的公式。修订和收缩都是完全增量的,即旧的信息永远不会被遗忘,并且可以在其他更改后恢复。此外,在某种意义上,变化的顺序并不重要。
We present an approach which provides a common solution to problems recently addressed in two different research areas: nonmonotonic reasoning and theory revision. We define a framework for default reasoning based on the notion of preferred maximal consistent subsets of the premises. Contrary to other formalizations of default reasoning, this framework is able to handle also unanticipated inconsistencies. This makes it possible to handle revisions of default theories by simply adding the new information. Contractions require the introduction of constraints, i.e. formulas used to determine preferred maximal consistent subsets but not used to determine the derivable formulas. Both, revisions and contractions, are totally incremental, i.e. old information is never forgotten and may be recovered after additional changes. Moreover, the order of changes is — in a certain sense — unimportant.