Competitive Bidding for Offshore Petroleum Leases

Competitive Bidding for Offshore Petroleum Leases
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海上石油租赁竞争性招标

DOI:
10.2307/3003588
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发表时间:
1978
期刊:
The Bell Journal of Economics
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
D. K. Reece
D. K. Reece
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
D. K. Reece

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

本文建立了一个正式的竞争性投标模型来分析联邦海上石油租赁系统的某些方面。感兴趣的租赁销售的特点往往是拍卖参与者人数少,而且所提供的租赁的真实价值高度不确定。该模型表明,这些情况可能导致通过购买租赁来获取相当大一部分经济租金。事实上,我们的研究结果表明,政府应该愿意资助大量的探索努力,使更好的预售信息进入公共领域。还考虑了不确定性水平和竞标者数量对行业效率的影响。
This paper develops a formal model of competitive bidding to analyze some aspects of the federal offshore oil leasing system. The lease sales of interest are often characterized by small numbers of auction participants and by high levels of uncertainty regarding the true values of the leases offered. The model suggests that these circumstances may lead to the capture of a substantial fraction of economic rent by the purchases of leases. Indeed, our results suggest that the government should be willing to fund a substantial exploration effort to bring better presale information into the public domain. Some effects of the level of uncertainty and the number of competing bidders on industry efficiency are also considered.