Self-Interest Bias in Moral Judgments of Others' Actions
Self-Interest Bias in Moral Judgments of Others' Actions
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DOI：
10.1177/0146167214529800
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发表时间：
2014-07-01
影响因子：
4
通讯作者：
Wojciszke, Bogdan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bocian, Konrad;Wojciszke, Bogdan
道德判断的自动性和情感性导致了这样一种预期，即这些判断是受观察者自身利益的影响而产生的。尽管自利偏见的概念由来已久，但它从未被直接用于对他人行为的道德判断。三个实验的参与者观察其他人的反规范行为（违反规则或作弊），这被认为是不道德的。然而，当观察者从观察到的行为中获益时，这种判断就变得宽松得多了。这三项研究都表明，自我利益对道德判断的影响完全是通过观察者对不道德行为的肇事者的好感增加来调节的，而不是通过情绪的变化。当参与者被诱导不喜欢犯罪者时（在适度的过程设计中），自我利益偏见消失了。道德判断的直觉主义方法的影响进行了讨论。
The automatic and affective nature of moral judgments leads to the expectation that these judgments are biased by an observer's own interests. Although the idea of self-interest bias is old, it has never been directly tested with respect to the moral judgments of other individuals' behaviors. The participants of three experiments observed other individuals' counternormative behavior (breaking a rule or cheating for gain), which was judged as immoral. However, this judgment became much more lenient when the observers gained from the observed behavior. All three studies showed that the influence of self-interest on moral judgments was completely mediated by the observer's increased liking for the perpetrator of the immoral acts but not by changes in mood. When the participants were induced to dislike the perpetrator (in a moderation-of-process design), the self-interest bias disappeared. Implications for the intuitionist approach to moral judgment are discussed.