Common sense, intuition, and theory in personality and social psychology

Common sense, intuition, and theory in personality and social psychology
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DOI:
10.1207/s15327957pspr0802_4
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发表时间:
2004-01-01
影响因子:
10.8
通讯作者:
Cacioppo, JT
Cacioppo, JT
中科院分区:
心理学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Cacioppo, JT

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人格和社会心理学的理论工作得益于对先前关于问题的经验和理论工作的充分理解,以及知情的直觉。通过多年的学习、调查和解决问题,人们对一个主题产生了直觉,就像国际象棋大师发展出一套复杂的认知结构,改变了国际象棋棋盘的外观一样。在某种程度上,由于主题是如此个人化,刚接触个性和社会心理学的学生基于非系统的经验和观察,得出了许多关于社会过程和行为的直觉、先前的信念和幼稚的理论。这些直觉可能会阻碍或促进理论进步。讨论了导师、评论和经验测试在最小化这些进入偏差的有害影响方面的作用。然而,精致的科学直觉也容易出错,因此我们也讨论了将这些误差降到最低的方法。
Theoretical work in personality and social psychology benefits from a well-developed understanding of the prior empirical and theoretical work on a problem and from informed intuitions. Intuitions develop about a subject matter through years of study, investigation, and problem solving, just as chess masters develop a sophisticated set of cognitive structures that change the very appearance of the chess board. In part because the subject matter is so personal, students new to personality and social psychology arrive with many intuitions, prior beliefs, and naive theories about social processes and behavior based on unsystematic experiences and observations. These intuitions can hinder or foster theoretical progress. The role of mentors, critiques, and empirical tests in minimizing the deleterious effects of these entry biases is discussed. Refined scientific intuitions are also subject to error however so means of minimizing these errors are also discussed.