Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design
Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design
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本着阿罗、德布鲁和罗尔斯精神的代际风险分担及其在社会保障设计中的应用
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.268691
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发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Laurence Ball
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
N. Mankiw;Laurence Ball
本文研究了代际重叠经济中的风险最优分配问题。它比较了经济自然达到的风险分配与如果罗尔斯“无知之幕”背后的几代人可以通过完整的阿罗-德布鲁或有债权市场相互分担风险的分配。然后，本文探讨了政府如何通过社会保障体系实现最佳的代际风险分担。一个结论是，该系统必须要么持有股本债权，要么将收益与股本回报率挂钩。
This paper examines the optimal allocation of risk in an overlapping‐generations economy. It compares the allocation of risk the economy reaches naturally to the allocation that would be reached if generations behind a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” could share risk with one another through complete Arrow‐Debreu contingent‐claims markets. The paper then examines how the government might implement optimal intergenerational risk sharing with a social security system. One conclusion is that the system must either hold equity claims to capital or negatively index benefits to equity returns.