Design of a Cyberattack Resilient 77 GHz Automotive Radar Sensor
Design of a Cyberattack Resilient 77 GHz Automotive Radar Sensor
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DOI：
10.3390/electronics9040573
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发表时间：
2020-04-01
期刊：
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Alsweiss, Suleiman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Toker, Onur;Alsweiss, Suleiman
在本文中，我们提出了一种新型 77 GHz 汽车雷达传感器，并通过实际测量展示了其网络攻击弹性。所提出的系统建立在标准调频连续波 (FMCW) 雷达射频前端之上，新颖之处在于固件级别使用的 DSP 算法。所有攻击场景均基于德州仪器 (TI) AWR 系列 77 GHz 雷达生成的真实雷达信号，并且所有测量均使用同一雷达系列完成。对于传感器网络，包括共享雷达测量的互连自动驾驶车辆，网络/通信层的网络攻击是一个已知的关键问题，并且已经由几位不同的研究人员解决。本文讨论的是物理层的网络攻击，即敌方代理生成 77 GHz 电磁波，这可能会导致错误的目标检测、错误的距离/速度估计或未检测到现有目标。本文提出的主要算法不是基于预测过滤的网络攻击检测方案，其中测量值和预测值之间的“异常”差异会触发警报。其核心思想是基于一种物理质询-响应认证，并将其集成到雷达 DSP 固件中。
In this paper, we propose a novel 77 GHz automotive radar sensor, and demonstrate its cyberattack resilience using real measurements. The proposed system is built upon a standard Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar RF-front end, and the novelty is in the DSP algorithm used at the firmware level. All attack scenarios are based on real radar signals generated by Texas Instruments AWR series 77 GHz radars, and all measurements are done using the same radar family. For sensor networks, including interconnected autonomous vehicles sharing radar measurements, cyberattacks at the network/communication layer is a known critical problem, and has been addressed by several different researchers. What is addressed in this paper is cyberattacks at the physical layer, that is, adversarial agents generating 77 GHz electromagnetic waves which may cause a false target detection, false distance/velocity estimation, or not detecting an existing target. The main algorithm proposed in this paper is not a predictive filtering based cyberattack detection scheme where an "unusual" difference between measured and predicted values triggers an alarm. The core idea is based on a kind of physical challenge-response authentication, and its integration into the radar DSP firmware.