THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY
THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY
复制标题
自然主义谬误
DOI：
10.1080/0034408800750205
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发表时间：
1980
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
Helen A. Archibald
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Helen A. Archibald
关于如何区分自然主义和非自然主义的哲学争论可能与关于哪种观点是正确的争论一样多。尽管对自然主义和非自然主义的内容存在广泛的分歧，但对某些历史上有影响力的哲学账户作为非自然主义者的地位却有相当大的共识。特别是，人们普遍认为GE摩尔在《伦理学原理》中对善的解释是一种典型的非自然主义解释。事实上，如果要求当代哲学家中的一个代表性样本在元伦理学中命名一个非自然主义者，那么摩尔的名字几乎肯定会占主导地位。无论是好是坏，摩尔对非自然主义的讨论深刻地塑造了20世纪世纪的元伦理学。托马斯·鲍德温声称：“如果不参照《伦理学原理》，20世纪世纪英国的伦理学理论是难以理解的;简而言之，它直到1960年左右的历史是，尽管摩尔被认为驳斥了”伦理自然主义“，但摩尔自己的”伦理非自然主义“被认为提出了不可接受的形而上学和认识论要求;因此，唯一的办法是放弃对客观道德现实的信仰，接受情感主义、规定主义或其他反现实主义的道德价值观。”（Baldwin 1990：[66]最近的非自然主义理论的捍卫者（例如Shafer-Landau 2003，以诺2011，和Parfit 2011）经常在许多方面将他们的解释与摩尔的解释区分开来，但很少有人会质疑摩尔的解释是一个典型的非自然主义理论。
There may be as much philosophical controversy about how to distinguish naturalism from non-naturalism as there is about which view is correct. In spite of this widespread disagreement about the content of naturalism and nonnaturalism there is considerable agreement about the status of certain historically influential philosophical accounts as non-naturalist. In particular, there is widespread agreement that G.E. Moore's account of goodness in Principia Ethica is a paradigmatically non-naturalist account. Indeed, if a representative sample of contemporary philosophers were asked to name a non-naturalist in meta-ethics then Moore's name almost certainly would predominate. For better or worse, Moore's discussion of non-naturalism profoundly shaped 20 century meta-ethics. Thomas Baldwin was not exaggerating much when he claimed that, “twentieth century British ethical theory is unintelligible without reference to Principia Ethica; its history until 1960 or so being, in brief, that although Moore was taken to have refuted ‘ethical naturalism’, Moore's own brand of ‘ethical non-naturalism’ was thought to make unacceptable metaphysical and epistemological demands; so the only recourse was to abandon belief in an objective moral reality and accept an emotivist, prescriptivist or otherwise anti-realist, account of ethical values.” (Baldwin 1990: 66) More recent defenders of non-naturalist theories (e.g. Shafer-Landau 2003, Enoch 2011, and Parfit 2011) often distinguish their accounts from Moore's in a number of ways, but few if any would dispute that Moore's account is a paradigmatically non-naturalist one.