A Mobile Platform's In‐App Advertising Contract Under Agency Pricing for App Sales
A Mobile Platform's In‐App Advertising Contract Under Agency Pricing for App Sales
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DOI：
10.1111/poms.12647
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发表时间：
2017-02
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Lin Hao;Hong Guo;Robert F. Easley
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lin Hao;Hong Guo;Robert F. Easley
与传统媒体广告不同，移动平台的应用内广告市场呈现出两个独特的特征：移动平台的分体结构，由平台所有者和应用程序开发商共同提供应用内广告，以及应用程序销售的代理定价。我们开发了一个双边市场模型来分析这两个独特功能在确定平台所有者的最佳广告收入分享合同方面的作用。我们的结果揭示了一个有趣的 N 形动态，即平台所有者相对于广告商对应用内广告的整体估值的广告收入份额的最佳选择。我们为平台所有者确定了代理间补贴策略，她发现通过广告渠道补贴开发商是最佳选择，从而为双方带来更大的利润。我们发现，应用程序销售代理定价下的广告收入分享合同导致应用程序价格高于传统广告中的集成平台提供的价格。然而，当平台所有者从广告和应用程序销售渠道获得收入时，广告价格会根据平台所有者对广告收入份额的最优选择进行协调，从而导致平台所有者在广告层面上的兴趣与应用程序开发者的利益一致。
Unlike advertising in traditional media, a mobile platform's in‐app advertising market exhibits two unique features—split structure of the mobile platform with a platform owner and an app developer jointly provisioning in‐app advertising, and agency pricing for app sales. We develop a two‐sided market model to analyze the role of these two unique features in determining the platform owner's optimal advertising revenue‐sharing contract. Our results reveal an interesting N‐shaped dynamic regarding the platform owner's optimal choice of her ad revenue share with respect to the overall advertisers’ valuation of in‐app ads. We identify a between‐agent subsidization strategy for the platform owner, where she finds it optimal to subsidize the developer via the advertising channel, leading to greater profits for both of them. We find that the advertising revenue‐sharing contract under agency pricing for app sales leads to a higher app price than would be offered by the integrated platform found in traditional advertising. However, the ad price is coordinated under the platform owner's optimal choice of ad revenue share when she obtains revenue from both the advertising and app sales channels, leading to an alignment of her interest with the app developer's on ad level.