Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
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科学史与科学哲学研究
DOI：
10.1103/revmodphys.33.426
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
44.1
通讯作者：
L. Hoddeson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
L. Brown;M. Riordan;M. Dresden;L. Hoddeson
这个特别部分源于2013年6月在圣母大学举行的“科学中的认知态度和价值观”研讨会。尽管本书中的每一篇论文都以不同的方式探讨了这一主题，但它们都探讨了一个中心主题，即仔细关注科学家可用的认知态度的范围以及它们之间的差异可能有助于产生更仔细和更有见地的方式来思考科学价值观的适当作用。这篇特别部分的介绍首先简要概述了最近关于认知态度及其与思考科学价值观的相关性的文献。第二部分对本节的文章进行了总结，突出了每篇文章对中心主题的讨论所作的独特贡献。认知态度是对某种内容的评价反应，如假设、理论、模型、命题或其他形式的表征。虽然信仰和相关的概率判断，如信仰程度（置信度或可信度）传统上受到科学哲学家和认识论家的极大关注，但最近的学术研究引起了人们对真实的科学家在探究过程中所采取的认识和实践态度的细微差别和多样性的关注（例如，Elliott，2013; Elliott & McKaughan，2014; McKaughan，2007，2008，2012;货车Fraassen，1980; Wray，2001）。除了相信之外，还有各种其他形式的合格的、片面的和试探性的态度，在科学实践中发挥着重要作用。这类有意的心理状态，或者用来表达它们的言语行为，有时候会用态度动词来标记，比如接受、假定或预设、假设或猜想、预测、推测、猜测、怀疑、娱乐、判断是否值得追求等等，例如，考虑一下关于信仰和接受的文献。C. S.皮尔士是最早坚持信仰和科学接受之间的原则性区别的人之一（皮尔士，1898，56），但乔纳森·科恩的专著《关于信仰和接受的论文》（An Essay on Belief and Acceptance，1992）中的描述是当今最有影响力的。科恩在他对信仰和接受的描述中建立了一些条件，其中一些条件比其他条件更具争议性。科恩对比这两种态度的方法之一是关于自愿控制的问题。而相信一个命题p，往往被认为是为了
This special section grew out of a workshop on “Cognitive Attitudes and Values in Science” thatwas held at the University of Notre Dame in June 2013. Although each of the papers included in this volume approaches the topic in different ways, they all explore the central theme of how careful attention to the range of cognitive attitudes available to scientists and the differences between them might help to generatemore careful and insightful ways of thinking about the appropriate roles for values in science. This introduction to the special section begins with a brief overview of recent literature on cognitive attitudes and its relevance for thinking about values in science. The second part provides a summary of the articles in this section, highlighting the distinctive contribution that each makes to discussions about the central theme. Cognitive attitudes are evaluative responses directed toward some sort of content, such as hypotheses, theories, models, propositions, or other forms of representation. While belief and associated probabilistic judgments such as degrees of belief (levels of confidence or credence) have traditionally received the lion’s share of attention from philosophers of science and epistemologists, recent scholarship has drawn attention to the nuance and variety of epistemic and practical attitudes that real scientists adopt in the course of inquiry (e.g., Elliott, 2013; Elliott & McKaughan, 2014; McKaughan, 2007, 2008, 2012; van Fraassen, 1980; Wray, 2001). In addition to believing, there are a variety of other forms of qualified, partial and tentative attitudes that play an important role in scientific practice. Intentional mental states of this sort, or the speech acts used to express them, are sometimes marked by attitude verbs such as accept, assume or presuppose, hypothesize or conjecture, predict, speculate, guess, suspect, entertain, judge to be worthy of pursuit, and so on. For example, consider the literature on belief and acceptance. C. S. Peirce is among the earliest to insist on a principled distinction between belief and scientific acceptance (Peirce, 1898, 56), but the account in Jonathan Cohen’s monograph, An Essay on Belief and Acceptance (1992), is among the most influential today. Cohen builds a number of conditions into his accounts of belief and acceptance, some more controversial than others. One of the ways that Cohen contrasts these two attitudes turns on the issue of voluntary control. Whereas believing a proposition, p, is often regarded as for