Performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution
Performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution
复制标题
污染监管中的绩效与设计标准
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(87)90043-0
复制
发表时间：
1987
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
David Besanko
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
David Besanko
本文提出了一个寡头垄断市场中的污染管制模型。两种形式的监管被认为是：性能标准，直接管理污染的上限排放量，和设计标准，间接管理污染的最低使用要求的排放控制输入。每个监管制度下的均衡的特点。福利分析表明，性能标准是首选的设计标准，如果目标是最大限度地减少排放加上污染损害成本。然而，如果管制者的目标是总剩余减去污染损害，那么这种比较就不确定了。排放税和性能标准之间的等价性已经建立，因此上述福利比较也适用于排放税与设计标准。
This paper presents a model of pollution regulation in an oligopolistic market. Two forms of regulation are considered: performance standards which regulate pollution directly by an upper limit on emissions, and design standards which regulate pollution indirectly by a minimum usage requirement of an enissions control input. Equilibria under each regulatory regime are characterized. A welfare analysis reveals that performance standards are preferred to design standards if the objective is minimization of emissions plus pollution damage costs. However, the comparison is indeterminate if the regulator's objective is total surplus less pollution damage. An equivalence between emissions taxes and performance standards is established, so the above welfare comparisons also apply to emissions taxes versus design standards.