Syndicated Loans: The Role of Covenants in Mitigating Lender Disagreements
Syndicated Loans: The Role of Covenants in Mitigating Lender Disagreements
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银团贷款：契约在缓解贷款人分歧方面的作用
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1786141
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Qinghai Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Dass;Vikram Nanda;Qinghai Wang
我们研究契约在银团贷款中的作用。我们认为，除了作为一种监测借款人的手段，契约可以帮助减少银团中牵头银行和参与银行之间的利益冲突。例如，当牵头银行有动机支持表现不佳的借款人并提供贷款修改时，就会出现这种分歧，而其他银团贷款人则没有。我们开发了一个简单的模型，并找到实证支持其预测，契约是不太可能存在：（一）在非银团与银团贷款;（二）当铅的贷款分配更大，（三）当参与银行附属机构持有大量股权的借款人。与这一证据相一致，我们发现，牵头银行更有可能与通过关联实体持有借款人股权的银行联合。
We study the role of covenants in syndicated bank loans. We argue that, in addition to being a device for monitoring the borrower, covenants can help mitigate conflicts of interest between the lead-arranger and participating banks in the syndicate. Such disagreements can arise when, for instance, a lead-arranger has the incentive to support a poorly performing borrower and offer loan modification – while other syndicate lenders do not. We develop a simple model and find empirical support for its predictions that covenants are less likely to be present: (i) in non-syndicated versus syndicated loans; (ii) when the lead's loan allocation is greater and (iii) when participating bank affiliates hold substantial equity in the borrower. Consistent with this evidence, we find that lead arrangers are more likely to syndicate with banks that hold borrower equity through affiliated entities.