The Washington Declaration and the “Poor Relation”: Anglo-American Atomic Diplomacy, 1945–46
The Washington Declaration and the “Poor Relation”: Anglo-American Atomic Diplomacy, 1945–46
复制标题
华盛顿宣言和“不良关系”：英美原子外交，1945-46
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-7709.1984.tb00405.x
复制
发表时间：
1984
影响因子：
0.4
通讯作者：
J. Gormly
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Gormly
1945年10月3日，哈里·S·杜鲁门总统在国会发表演讲时，将原子能的控制确定为“世界头号问题”。他还透露，他愿意与美国的核伙伴英国和加拿大讨论这个问题，并暗示这样的谈判将是国际化控制原子能的第一步。杜鲁门的声明受到了广泛的欢迎。像加拿大外交部长莱斯特·皮尔逊一样，许多人希望这次会议将开始消除原子武器和将原子能置于有效国际控制之下的进程。自杜鲁门发表声明以来，许多人质疑他隐瞒或分享美国核信息和控制权的动机。大多数美国原子能和外交政策的分析家认为，杜鲁门政府试图将其原子垄断作为苏美关系中的外交工具，要么作为威胁，要么作为诱使俄罗斯更好地行为的诱因。在确定美国是否打算分享其核信息、核技术和核控制时，重点是美苏互动。很少有人把这个问题当作英美外交中的一个问题来研究。然而，杜鲁门政府对伦敦获取信息和控制权的渴望的反应为美国的原子外交提供了另一个视角。如果有任何国家能够获得美国的核信息，并分享控制原子能的使用，
In his 3 October 1945 speech to Congress, President Harry S Truman identified the control of atomic energy as the “number one problem in the world.” He also revealed his willingness to discuss the problem with America’s nuclear partners, the United Kingdom and Canada, and implied that such talks would be the first step toward internationalizing the control of atomic energy. Truman’s announcement was greeted with widespread approval. Like Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson, many hoped that the meeting would begin the process of eliminating atomic weapons and placing atomic energy under effective international control.’Since Truman’s statement, many have questioned his motives for withholding or sharing American nuclear information and control. Most analysts of US atomic and foreign policy argue that the Truman administration sought to use its atomic monopoly as a diplomatic tool in Soviet-American relations, either as a threat or as an inducement to solicit better Russian behavior. In determining whether or not the United States intended to share its nuclear information, technology, and control, the focus has been on American-Soviet interactions. Few have examined this issue as a problem in British-American diplomacy.* The Truman administration’s reaction to London’s desire for information and control provides another perspective on American atomic diplomacy, however. If any nation could have gained access to American nuclear information and shared in controlling the uses of atomic energy, it