The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
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DOI：
10.1257/0002828042002606
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发表时间：
2004-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
E. Maskin;J. Tirole
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Maskin;J. Tirole
我们建立了一个简单的模型来捕捉公职人员问责制（即让他们连任）的主要优点和缺点：一方面，问责制允许公众筛选和纪律他们的官员；另一方面，问责制允许公众筛选和纪律他们的官员。另一方面，这可能会导致这些官员迎合民意，过少关注少数群体的福利。我们研究决策权何时应该直接分配给公众（直接民主）、负责任的官员（称为“政治家”）或不负责任的官员（称为“法官”）。
We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making public officials accountable (i.e., subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand, accountablity allows the public to screen and discipline their officials; on the other, it may induce those officials to pander to public opinion and put too little weight on minority welfare. We study when decision-making powers should be allocated to the public directly (direct democracy), to accountable officials (called “politicians”), or to nonaccountable officials (called “judges”).