Precis of breakdown of will
Precis of breakdown of will
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DOI：
10.1017/s0140525x05000117
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发表时间：
2005-10-01
影响因子：
29.3
通讯作者：
Ainslie, G
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ainslie, G
长期以来，行为科学一直对诱惑的经历、由此产生的冲动以及对这种冲动的不同成功控制感到困惑。在传统理论中，像自我这样的支配能力会随着时间的推移一致地评估未来的选择，以指数级的方式折现它们的延迟价值，也就是以恒定的速度；当自我遇到条件胃口时，冲动就会出现。《意志的崩溃》(安斯利2001)提出了与这一模型相矛盾的证据。人们和非人类的年利率都会自发地对预期事件的价值进行折现，在这条曲线上，价值被预期延迟近似除以，这是一种比有理指数曲线更弯曲的双曲线形式。在双曲线贴现的情况下，回报迅速的期权暂时会被优先选择，而不是更有钱但支付速度更慢的期权，这种现象在从几分钟到几天的时间里可以解释冲动行为，而在几秒钟内的时间段可以解释非自愿行为。相互矛盾的奖励获取过程实际上可以相互讨价还价，而稳定的偏好可以通过将反复选择作为反复出现的跨期囚犯困境中的测试案例(先例)的感知来建立。由此产生的动机模式类似于对意志的传统描述，以及对强迫现象的描述，这些现象现在可以被视为意志的副作用：过度关注先例，难以克服但有限度的自我控制失败，有动力的(动态的)无意识，以及无法利用情感回报。双曲线还暗示了一种将经典的条件反射简化为动机选择的方法，这是将许多非自愿过程(如情绪和食欲)建模为寻求奖励行为的最后必要步骤；这样的建模反过来为同理心奖励和现实的“构建”提供了理论基础。
Behavioral science has long been puzzled by the experience of temptation, the resulting impulsiveness, and the variably successful control of this impulsiveness. in conventional theories, a governing faculty like the ego evaluates future choices consistently over time, discounting their value for delay exponentially, that is, by a constant rate; impulses arise when this ego is confronted by a conditioned appetite. Breakdown of Will (Ainslie 2001) presents evidence that contradicts this model. Both people and nonhuman annuals spontaneously discount the value of expected events in a curve where value is divided approximately by expected delay, a hyperbolic form that is more bowed than the rational, exponential curve.With hyperbolic discounting, options that pay off quickly will be temporarily preferred to richer but slower-paying alternatives, a phenomenon that, over periods from minutes to days, can account for impulsive behaviors, and over periods of fractional seconds can account for involuntary behaviors. Contradictory reward-getting processes can in effect bargain with each other, and stable preferences can be established by the perception of recurrent choices as test cases (precedents) in recurrent intertemporal prisoners dilemmas. The resulting motivational pattern resembles traditional descriptions of the will, as well as of compulsive phenomena that can now be seen as side-effects of will: over-concern with precedent, intractable but circumscribed failures of self-control, a motivated ("dynamic") unconscious, and an inability to exploit emotional rewards. Hyperbolic curves also suggest a means of reducing classical conditioning to motivated choice, the last necessary step for modeling many involuntary processes like emotion and appetite as reward-seeking behaviors; such modeling, in turn, provides a rationale for empathic reward and the "construction" of reality.