Efficiency and Legitimacy: Trade-Offs in IMF Governance
Efficiency and Legitimacy: Trade-Offs in IMF Governance
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效率与合法性：国际货币基金组织治理的权衡
DOI：
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Cottarelli
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Cottarelli
为国际货币基金组织等国际金融机构设计适当的治理结构是困难的，因为通过限制其决策过程来增强此类机构的合法性可能会影响其运作效率。对于任何公共机构来说，合法性和效率之间都存在潜在的权衡，但对于国际机构来说可能更为严重，因为向其下放权力在政治上存在争议，因此可能意味着更严格的限制。然而，本文还强调，权衡并不是绝对的：它们取决于追求合法性的具体方式，即取决于设定的具体限制。因此，战略改革的目标应该是通过探索在合法性和效率方面帕累托改进的步骤来改善权衡条件。
Designing appropriate governance structures for an international financial institution such as the IMF is difficult, because steps to enhance the legitimacy of such an institution through constraints on its decision-making process may affect its operational efficiency. Potential trade-offs between legitimacy and efficiency exist for any public institution but are arguably more severe for an international one, because delegating power to it politically controversial and, thus, likely to imply tighter constraints. The paper also underscores that the trade-offs are not absolute, however: they depend on the specific ways in which legitimacy is pursuedthat is, on the specific constraints that are set. Strategic reforms should, thus, aim at improving the terms of the trade-off by exploring steps that are Pareto-improving in the dimensions of legitimacy and efficiency.