Logistics service sharing and competition in a dual-channel e-commerce supply chain
Logistics service sharing and competition in a dual-channel e-commerce supply chain
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DOI：
10.1016/j.cie.2020.106849
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发表时间：
2020-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. He;Jiaying Wen;Shun Ye;Zhaoqiong Li
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. He;Jiaying Wen;Shun Ye;Zhaoqiong Li
物流服务在电子商务业务中发挥着越来越重要的作用。电商之间的物流服务共享（LSS）为更多消费者提供了更好的服务体验，但也带来了新的竞争问题。在本文中，我们研究了由制造商和零售商组成的双渠道电子商务供应链中的 LSS 以及由此产生的竞争问题。制造商将产品批发给零售商，然后零售商将其零售给消费者，制造商同时将相同的产品直接销售给消费者。零售商拥有优势的物流服务资源，可以与制造商共享。我们对两种情况进行建模：没有 LSS 和有 LSS。对于每种情况，我们将该供应链中的竞争问题建模为 Stackelberg 博弈，其中零售商充当领导者，制造商充当追随者。提供了每个企业的最优决策和利润以及每种情况下的消费者剩余和社会福利。我们发现，与没有LSS的情况相比，在有LSS的情况下，制造商的零售价格总是增加，但零售商的零售价格可能会增加或减少，具体取决于共享物流服务的价格。两家公司的利润变化还取决于共享物流服务的价格。研究发现，如果该价格在一定范围内，两家企业可以通过LSS进行帕累托改进，并且随着竞争强度的增加，该范围会缩小。当共享物流服务的价格低于阈值时，有LSS的社会福利将大于没有LSS的社会福利。
Logistics service plays an increasingly important role in e-commerce business. Logistics service sharing (LSS) among e-commerce firms provides more consumers with better service experience, but gives rise to new competition problem. In this paper, we study the LSS and the resulting competition problem in a dual-channel e-commerce supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer wholesales products to the retailer who then retails them to consumers, and the manufacturer simultaneously sells the same products to consumers directly. The retailer owns superior logistics service resource, which can be shared with the manufacturer. We model two cases: without LSS and with LSS. For each case, we model the competition problem in this supply chain as a Stackelberg game, where the retailer acts as the leader and the manufacturer acts as the follower. Optimal decisions and profits of each firm as well as consumer surplus and social welfare in each case are provided. We find that compared to the case without LSS, in the case with LSS, the manufacturer’s retail price always increases, but the retailer’s retail price may increase or decrease, depending on the price of the shared logistics service. The profit change of the two firms also depends on the price of the shared logistics service. It is found that the two firms can be Pareto improved by LSS if this price lies in a certain range, which shrinks when the competition intensity increases. The social welfare with LSS will be greater than that without LSS when the price of the shared logistics service is less than a threshold.