Shareholder nonparticipation in valuable rights offerings: New findings for an old puzzle
Shareholder nonparticipation in valuable rights offerings: New findings for an old puzzle
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股东不参与有价值的配股：老谜题的新发现
DOI：
10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.01.011
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
8.9
通讯作者：
Jeffrey Pontiff
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Holderness;Jeffrey Pontiff
股东在有价值的国内配股发行中的平均参与率仅为%，远低于之前的断言。这导致财富从不参与的股东转移到参与发行的股东手中，平均为发行的7%。财富转移在不可转移和更大规模的产品中更大。股市对更大规模的财富转移的反应更为负面。股东参与度较低的股票也未能提高公开宣布的资本目标。配股在制度上限制非参股股东财富损失的国家要普遍得多。这些发现表明，代理冲突影响了权利要约的使用。
Shareholder participation in valuable domestic rights offerings averages only 64%, which is considerably lower than previously asserted. This causes wealth transfers from nonparticipating to participating shareholders that average 7% of the offering. Wealth transfers are larger in nontransferable and bigger offerings. The stock market reacts more negatively to larger wealth transfers. Offerings with lower shareholder participation also fall short in raising publicly stated capital goals. Rights offerings are far more common in countries with institutional practices that limit nonparticipating shareholders’ wealth losses. These findings suggest that agency conflicts influence the use of rights offers.