A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction
A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3324776
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发表时间：
2019-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Takehito Masuda;Toyotaka Sakai;Shigehiro Serizawa;Takuma Wakayama
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文献类型：
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作者：
Takehito Masuda;Toyotaka Sakai;Shigehiro Serizawa;Takuma Wakayama
我们对多单元维克瑞拍卖进行了实验室实验，无论是否向受试者提供有关策略证明的建议。虽然在没有建议的情况下，受试者说真话的比例保持在 20%，但在有建议的情况下，这一比例上升到 47%。通过对不具有策略证明的按出价拍卖进行类似的实验，我们确认我们的结果不是由于所谓的实验者需求效应造成的。此外，建议提高了维克里拍卖的效率，特别是在拍卖对象经验不足的早期阶段。众所周知，在几次维克里拍卖实验中，受试者往往出价过高。我们的结果表明，简单的建议有可能通过促进对维克里拍卖中策略验证属性的更好理解来减少这种过度出价。策略证明机制有时会受到批评，因为玩家常常无法发现说真话的好处，但我们的观察表明，引入有关策略证明属性的建议有助于他们“正确”行事。
We conduct laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auction with and without providing advice to subjects on strategy-proofness. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without advice, the rate increases to 47% with advice. By conducting similar experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, we confirm that our results are not due to so-called experimenter demand effects. Moreover, advice improves efficiency in the Vickrey auction, particularly in early periods in which subjects are less experienced. It is well known that subjects tend to overbid in several Vickrey auction experiments. Our results indicate the possibility that simple advice decreases such overbidding by promoting better understanding of the strategy-proofness property in the Vickrey auction. Strategy-proof mechanisms are sometimes criticized because players often fail to find the benefit of truth-telling, but our observations show that introducing advice on the property of strategy-proofness helps them to behave "correctly."