ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE
ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE
复制标题
DOI：
10.1163/2352-0248_edn_a0826000
复制
发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
F. Larmande;J. Ponssard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
F. Larmande;J. Ponssard
：应用可控性原则来消除外部因素在实践中仍然存在问题。一个关键问题涉及这样一个事实：管理者可能会获得一些有关该外部环境的私人决策前信号，并可能使用这些信息来减轻或放大其影响。这个问题是在多任务代理模型中进行分析的，在该模型中，代理承担有限责任，从而赚取租金，并且对所执行的任务并不漠不关心。在一定条件下，证明最优契约只是选择性地消除环境的影响。如果代理报告环境影响较小的信号，它会中和它，但如果代理报告环境影响较大的信号，它不会将其过滤掉。
: The application of the controllability principle to eliminate external factors remains problematic in practice. A key issue concerns the fact that the manager may get some private pre-decision signal about this external environment and may use this information to mitigate or amplify its impact. The question is analyzed in a multitask agency model in which the agent has a limited liability, thus earns rents and is not indifferent to the task performed. Under certain conditions, it is proved that the optimal contract only selectively eliminates the impact of the environment. It does neutralize it if the agent reports a signal of low impact of the environment but does not filter it out if the agent reports a signal of high impact.