The Intelligent Offense and Defense Mechanism of Internet of Vehicles Based on the Differential Game-IP Hopping
The Intelligent Offense and Defense Mechanism of Internet of Vehicles Based on the Differential Game-IP Hopping
复制标题
基于差分博弈-IP跳频的车联网智能攻防机制
DOI：
10.1109/access.2020.3004255
复制
发表时间：
2020-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Yu, Yao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
He, Yun;Zhang, Min;Yu, Yao
路侧单元(RSU)是车联网(IoV)的重要组成部分，它收集了大量用户的隐私信息，并将车辆接入互联网。当前RSU采用静态配置运行，攻击者可以获得足够的时间分析RSU的漏洞并发起攻击，这对IoV的隐私安全构成了巨大的威胁。在这种不对称的情况下，攻击者占据主导地位，很难完全防守。为解决上述攻防不对称问题，采用移动目标防御(MTD)动态改变RSU的IP地址，增加了攻击者的攻击难度。但是，由于RSU的IP跳频选择不合理，使得RSU的IP跳跃很难发挥其防御作用，或者可能会带来过多的防御开销。针对上述问题，本文提出了一种基于微分博弈的智能攻防机制，该机制能够自适应地调整RSU的IP跳频，最大化其防御效益。首先，基于攻防关系，我们将RSU的IP跳频智能安排建模为一个微分博弈(即IP跳跃博弈)，攻击者试图最大化其潜在利益，而RSU设法最大化其防御利益。在此基础上，我们计算了IP跳跃博弈的势纳什均衡。仿真结果表明，该机制能够根据攻击频率自适应地调整RSU的IP跳频，有效地防御攻击。与固定IP跳频机制相比，本文提出的机制可以弥补固定低频IP跳变防御的不足，避免固定高频IP跳变防御的过高防御开销。
The Road Side Unit (RSU) is an important part of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), which collects a large number of user's privacy information and connects vehicles to the Internet. The current RSU is running with static configurations, and the adversary can get enough time to analyze the vulnerability of the RSU and launch attacks, which poses a huge threat to the privacy security of the IoV. Under this asymmetrical condition, the attackers occupy a predominant position, and it is difficult to fully defend. To solve the above asymmetry offense-defense problem, we adopt the moving target defense (MTD) to dynamically change the IP address of the RSU, which increases the difficulty of the attacker's attack. However, due to the unreasonable selection of the RSU's IP hopping frequency, it is difficult for the RSU's IP hopping to exert its defense effect or it may introduce excessive defense overheads. Given the above issue, we propose an intelligent offense and defense mechanism based on a differential game approach, which can adaptively adjust the RSU's IP hopping frequency and maximize its defense benefits. First, based on the offense and defense relationship, we model the RSU's IP hopping frequency intelligent arrangement as a differential game (i.e., IP hopping game) in which the attacker attempts to maximize his potential benefits, and the RSU manages to maximize its defense benefits. On this basis, we calculate a potential Nash equilibrium of the IP hopping game. Finally, simulation results show our proposed mechanism can adaptively adjust the RSU's IP hopping frequency according to the attack frequency and effectively defend attacks. Compared with the mechanisms with a fixed IP hopping frequency, our proposed mechanism can make up for the ineffectiveness of the fixed low-frequency IP hopping defense and avoid the excessive defense overheads of the fixed high-frequency IP hopping defense.