AN EXPERIMENTAL-ANALYSIS OF ULTIMATUM BARGAINING
AN EXPERIMENTAL-ANALYSIS OF ULTIMATUM BARGAINING
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7
复制
发表时间：
1982-01-01
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
SCHWARZE, B
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
GUTH, W;SCHMITTBERGER, R;SCHWARZE, B
有很多关于讨价还价行为的实验研究，但令人惊讶的是，几乎没有人尝试通过实验来研究所谓的最后通牒讨价还价行为。最后通牒谈判博弈的特殊性质是，在谈判过程的每个阶段，只有一个参与者必须做出决定，并且在最后一个阶段之前，一组结果已经被限制为只有两个结果。为了让最后通牒的方面显而易见，我们集中在两个玩家和两个阶段的情况下。在“容易的游戏”中，给两个玩家分配一定数量的筹码，而在“复杂的游戏”中，玩家必须为两个玩家分配一捆价值不同的黑白筹码。我们为简单游戏和复杂游戏进行了两个主要实验。通过一个特殊的实验，考察了被试作为博弈者1的要求与他们作为博弈者2的接受决策之间的关系。
There are many experimental studies of bargaining behavior, but suprisingly enough nearly no attempt has been made to investigate the so-called ultimatum bargaining behavior experimentally. The special property of ultimatum bargaining games is that on every stage of the bargaining process only one player has to decide and that before the last stage the set of outcomes is already restricted to only two results. To make the ultimatum aspect obvious we concentrated on situations with two players and two stages. In the ‘easy games’ a given amountchas to be distributed among the two players, whereas in the ‘complicated games’ the players have to allocate a bundle of black and white chips with different values for both players. We performed two main experiments for easy games as well as for complicated games. By a special experiment it was investigated how the demands of subjects as player 1 are related to their acceptance decisions as player 2.